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Intertemporal Choice
J. R. Stevens, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
consumption in a foraging context. Caching provides a
remarkable example of intertemporal choice because of
the long delay until food recovery. Many other foraging-based intertemporal choices involve rather short delays: for instance, continuing feeding in the current food
patch versus moving on to another patch. In fact, patch
exploitation offers a classic example of intertemporal
choice from behavioral ecology that is well studied both
theoretically and empirically.
Imagine a bird eating berries from a bush. Every
berry consumed depletes the patch and increases the average time required to find the next berry. When should
the bird stop searching in that patch (after all, there
may be no more berries in the bush) and move to the
next bush? Staying too long can waste time better used
in searching for food elsewhere. Leaving too early can
waste opportunities to obtain a quick meal. Optimal foraging theory predicts a simple patch-leaving rule when
patches are similar: leave when the foraging rate in the
patch drops below the average foraging rate in the environment. We can calculate this foraging rate:

Introduction
A Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) flies to the
top of a pine tree and selects one of the many cones. She
twists and pecks at the stem until the cone breaks free
from the branch and, with one foot, holds the cone in
the crotch of a branch. She then repeatedly hammers her
long bill in between the scales of the cone. After forcing
out one of the seeds, she tips her head back a bit, clicks
the seed in her bill a few times, and closes her bill. A few
minutes later, the shredded cone drops to the snow, the
nutcracker having extracted several dozen seeds. Each
time she closes her bill, the nutcracker makes a choice:
she either swallows the seed or places it in a small
pouch of skin under her tongue. The seeds placed in her
pouch are destined for a site several kilometers away,
where she buries them under a bit of dirt or leaf litter. In
the autumn, she may bury 33,000 seeds in this manner,
only to return to uncover them a few months later during the harsh mountain winter. This form of food storing or caching typifies an interesting and wide-ranging
set of decisions faced by animals: intertemporal choices.
The term “intertemporal” choice refers to decisions
in which the benefits associated with different outcomes
occur at different times. For instance, for each seed, the
nutcracker must choose between eating it now versus
waiting to consume it in the winter. Often, there exists
a trade-off between the size of the benefit and the cost
(time delay), such that larger benefits accrue after longer
delays. Thus, the decisions of interest are between obtaining immediate or short-term rewards and investing
in a grander future.

A
τ+t+h

[1]

where A represents the amount of food, τ represents the
time required to travel between patches, t represents the
delay to finding food within a patch, and h represents
the time required to process and consume the food.
Maximizing this foraging rate results in an optimal solution to the question of intertemporal choice in the patchforaging situation.
Foraging decisions often involve the temporal tradeoffs characterizing intertemporal choices, from patch
foraging to caching to decide between a smaller, easierto- process food item and a larger, more difficult one.
Yet intertemporal choice extends far beyond foraging.
Returning to the category of life history examples, parental investment exemplifies an important temporal
tradeoff. Investment in current offspring reduces potential investment in future offspring. How should a parent
distribute investment over time? Also, mating decisions
have a critical temporal component—along the lines of
choosing between Mr. Right and Mr. Right Now. Should
an individual accept the currently available mate or continue looking for a higher quality mate?
Cooperative situations may also involve intertemporal choices. Reciprocal altruism, for instance, requires
that animals trade the immediate benefits of defection

Intertemporal Choice in the Wild
Although not usually framed in this way, many decisions that animals face involve a temporal trade-off. The
life history trade-off of growth versus reproduction offers an example of balancing the immediate, competitive benefits of growing larger with the delayed benefits
of investing in offspring. Even plants and other organisms face these kinds of temporal trade-offs. Although
these provide perfectly reasonable examples of temporal trade-offs, most work in this area has explored more
active intertemporal choice decisions that often reflect
the particular ecology of the individual species. The
food caching example provides a nice illustration of species-specific choices between immediate and delayed
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Figure 1. Models of temporal discounting describe how the subjective value of a reward at the present time decreases with the delay to receiving that reward. The exponential model promoted by economists predicts that the rate of discounting is constant over time, whereas,
the hyperbolic model promoted by psychologists predicts a decreasing rate of discounting. As an example, we can compare the difference in
values for the two models over two time frames: from t = 0 to t = 10 and from t = 10 to t = 20. At t = 0, both the hyperbolic model (Vh(0))
and the exponential model (Ve(0)) start with a value of 1. At t = 10, Vh(10) = 0.65 and Ve(10) = 0.61, thus the hyperbolic value decreased by
0.35 in 10 time units, and the exponential value decreased by 0.39. At t = 20, however, Vh(20) = 0.48 and Ve(20) = 0.37. The relative decrease
from t = 10 is 0.26 for hyperbolic and again 0.39 for exponential. Thus, the decrease remained the same for exponential value but diminished
for hyperbolic value.

against the delayed benefits of reciprocated cooperation.
Clearly, many behaviors fall under the umbrella of intertemporal choices, although they are not typically analyzed with this framework. Even when viewing these
decisions as intertemporal choices, researchers use various terms such as temporal discounting, self-control,
impulsivity, patience, and delayed gratification. Because
of the broad nature of intertemporal choices, they have
attracted the attention of many disciplines, including
economics and psychology, as well as biology.

Economics of Intertemporal Choice
One of the first disciplines to investigate intertemporal
choice was economics. Economists study the consumption of goods and services; thus, they want to know how
agents manage streams of benefits that accrue over time.
How do they balance the consumption of a small amount
of a commodity now compared to a larger amount later?
The economic perspective focuses on a “rational” account
of how agents should respond to choices over time. That
is, assuming that agents have all information about the
goods, what response provides the optimal return? Economists noticed that, when given a choice between the
same benefit immediately or in the future (say, one dollar now vs. in 20 years), people preferred the immediate
payoff. This effect suggests that people temporally discount or devalue future payoffs. In other words, a delay
reduces the subjective value of receiving a benefit. Why
should we discount the future?

Economic theory proposes a number of reasons
to discount the future. First, inflation literally makes
money less valuable. One dollar will buy more lollipops today than it will after 20 years. Also, individuals
can invest currently available benefits. That is, there are
opportunity costs associated with not being able to use
or invest benefits that are locked away during the delay. Investing one dollar now will yield much more in
20 years than one dollar. Finally, the future is uncertain.
A bird in the hand is worth three in the bush because
the three in the bush may never be in hand. Future rewards run the risk of not being realized; instead, some
force may interrupt their consumption.
These three reasons for discounting are related, and
economists have developed a model to account for intertemporal choice. In this model, each option yields a
present value:
V = δtA

[2]

where δ represents a discount factor and t represents the
delay to receiving reward amount A. The discount factor δ accounts for the remaining value after a single unit
of delay (thus, from δ we can calculate the rate of discounting—the proportional rate of decrease in value).
This “exponential discounting model” has a special feature: the rate of discounting remains constant across the
delay (Figure 1). So, a reward delayed 1 day after another reward is available will lose the same value if
the first reward is available today or in a year. In other
words, value decreases at the same rate across time.
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Figure 2. (a) The most frequently used method to investigate intertemporal choice in pigeons and rats is the self-control paradigm.
In this technique, subjects experience an intertrial interval in which
nothing happens. Following this interval, subjects choose between
receiving a small amount of food after a short delay and a large
amount of food after a long delay. After consuming the food, another
intertrial interval begins. (b) In the delayed gratification paradigm, a
certain amount of food accumulates at fixed rate, say, one food reward per 10 s. Interrupting the stream of food results in stopping
the accumulation of rewards.

This constant rate of discounting makes sense when
organisms discount because of future uncertainty, that
is, when the risk of interruption makes a delayed reward less valuable. If random events interrupt the receipt of delayed payoffs, then decision makers face
a constant probability of loss, making discounting to
match the environmental loss rate beneficial. Thus, discounting may closely relate to uncertainty and risk.

Psychology of Intertemporal Choice
For decades, psychologists have acted as the fly in the
ointment for the elegant economic models of decision
making. The psychological approach focuses on describing the actual behavior of decision makers rather than
creating models of omniscient, godlike agents. In many
cases, the models do not hold up well—behavior deviates substantially from the rational predictions. So, how
can we measure the temporal preferences of animals to
test the models?
Experimental Methods
Animal experiments often use the “self-control” paradigm to explore intertemporal choice (Figure 2(a)).
This typically involves offering a subject the choice
between a smaller amount of food after a shorter delay (smaller–sooner option) and a larger amount of
food available after a longer delay (larger–later option). Subjects often start with a fixed set of options,
then the experimenter adjusts either the long delay or
the larger amount to titrate an indifference point, that

is, to find a pair of options between which the subjects choose equally. For example, a subject may first
face the choice between two food items available immediately and six food items available immediately.
Assuming that the subject prefers the larger amount, a
one-second delay is added to the larger option. The experimenter will continue to add one second increments
to the large amount until the subject chooses the two
immediate food items as often as she chooses the six
delayed items. This indifference point then indicates
how long a subject will wait for three times as much
food. Many psychologists interpret these data as a kind
of discounting: the delayed food loses value relative to
the immediate food. As discussed later, biologists have
another interpretation that does not invoke discounting. Pigeons have been the workhorse for self-control
experiments, but rats and primates have been tested
using this technique as well.
The “delayed gratification” technique provides a
second method to study intertemporal choice in animals (Figure 2(b)). This method mirrors Walter
Mischel’s pioneering work on delayed gratification in
children. In the animal version, a stream of food rewards accumulates over a period of time. For instance,
a grape appears in front of the subject every 5 s. The
catch is, once a subject interrupts this stream by reaching for or eating the food, the stream stops. So if subjects can delay their gratification, they will receive all
of the rewards in the stream; however, they constantly
face the temptation to consume the available rewards.
Rather than choosing between two options, in the delayed gratification paradigm, subjects choose when to
stop waiting for the reward. Researchers have primarily used this method with primates but occasionally
with pigeons as well.
Hyperbolic Discounting
Most work on animal intertemporal choice uses the selfcontrol paradigm and assumes that this tests temporal
discounting in their subjects. With a series of indifference points, one can derive a discounting function that
quantitatively describes how reward values decrease
with delays. Recall that exponential discounting (Equation [2]) implies a constant rate of discounting. Unfortunately, experiments in both humans and other animals
show little support for this prediction. Instead, the discount rate decreases with time, showing high discounting at short delays and a lower rate at longer delays
(Figure 1). This type of discounting is termed “hyperbolic discounting.” Psychologists favor a particular hyperbolic function that describes how the present value
of a reward amount A decreases with the delay t :
V =

A
1 + kt

[3]
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where k represents a discounting parameter that accounts for the steepness of the slope. This model has a
declining discounting rate and describes data from pigeons, rats, and humans quite well.
The actual rate of discounting also violates the economic model. If viewed as a proxy for the interest rate
in humans or the interruption rate in animals, the rate
of discounting should be rather small. A rational investor should have a discount rate that matches available
interest rates (around, say, 5% per year). In experiments
and “field studies” in humans, the estimated discounting rates often range between 10 and 30% per year for
delays beyond 1 year (and are much higher for shorter
delays). Humans, therefore, choose much more impulsively than predicted by economic analysis because
they have strong preferences for sooner outcomes. Animals also exhibit impulsive preferences, but on an even
shorter time scale, typically only waiting for seconds or
minutes for delayed payoffs. This would imply implausibly high interruption rates (up to four interruptions
per minute!) to discount the future at this level. Thus,
from a psychological perspective, high levels of impulsivity remain a puzzle. Rather than offer ultimate explanations of behavior, the psychological perspective emphasizes the cognitive variables underlying behavior.
Cognitive Variables
The psychological study of intertemporal choice often
highlights how individuals overcome temptation for
short-term gratification. A number of cognitive variables play key roles in trade-offs between short- and
long-term rewards.
Commitment
One way to avoid the temptation of immediate gratification is to use external commitment devices that force
an individual to choose the delayed option. Examples
of commitment devices in humans include automatically transferring salary into a retirement account to
save money for the future, throwing away a pack of cigarettes to avoid smoking, placing the alarm clock across
the room to avert the draw of the snooze button, and
Ulysses lashing himself to the mast of his ship to resist
the Sirens’ songs. Although little or no evidence suggests that animals actively pursue commitment devices,
they can use them when available. For instance, Howard
Rachlin and Leonard Green conducted a series of experiments in which pigeons faced an additional choice before experiencing the standard self-control choice between a smaller–sooner and larger–later option. In one
version of the task, the subjects could choose between
experiencing a delay, then continuing on to the standard self-control choice or experiencing a delay, then
automatically receiving the larger–later option. This second choice represents a form of commitment because
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the pigeons can commit themselves in advance to the
larger–later option. Interestingly, the pigeons did use
the commitment device, and most subjects significantly
preferred it when a long delay separated to two sets of
choices. Therefore, the pigeons used commitment if the
temptation was far enough in the future.
Reward magnitude
Both the exponential and hyperbolic models predict that
the absolute magnitude of the rewards should not matter; only the relative magnitudes should matter. So, the
choice between one food item now and three items tomorrow should be devalued the same way as 20 items
now and 60 items tomorrow. Only the threefold increase
in reward amount should matter. The absolute magnitude does, however, influence choices in humans: the
discounting rate decreases as the magnitude increases.
So, human subjects choose more patiently (meaning that
they opt for the larger–later reward more often) when
assessing rewards in hundreds or thousands of dollars
compared to tens of dollars. Interestingly, this “magnitude effect” does not appear in animals. The ratio of rewards influences choices rather than the absolute magnitude. Testing the magnitude effect, however, proves
difficult in animals because the magnitudes cannot scale
to the same degree as in humans. Experiments in humans can vary hypothetical monetary payoffs over several orders of magnitude, whereas animal food rewards
can only vary over a single order of magnitude. Thus,
as we will see in the next section, the currency of the reward is a key aspect of intertemporal choice.
Currency
Food is the most commonly used reward currency in
studies of animal intertemporal choice because it is easy
to manipulate, highly motivating, and slow to cause satiation. Most experimental studies show that animals
will wait for seconds or minutes for food rewards. Water provides another primary reward (a reward needed
for survival) used in studies of intertemporal choice.
Self-control studies rewarding deprived rats with water show similar patterns as when using food: rats only
wait for a few seconds and their discounting function
matches the hyperbolic model. Unfortunately, we do
not have good experimental data on other currencies
such as mating opportunities or social contact, but this
provides an important avenue of future research. If intertemporal choices are adaptive in animals, we might
expect that different currencies vary in how they lose
value over different time scales, and animal intertemporal choices might match this variation. Food may elicit a
strong preference for immediacy because it often does
not persist long in the environment—competitors will
take it if you do not. Also, food is, of course, something
animals constantly need, so discounting of food may result from close ties to metabolic rates.
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Currency effects appear more prominently in humans. Food, money, and health options all seem to
show hyperbolic discounting but over different time
scales. In fact, when tested with food in a similar way
as other animals, humans also show very impulsive
choices. So, food seems to be a universally impulsive
currency. However, money and health options allow for
much longer-term delays, even if they are shorter than
those predicted by economic models.
Attention
Mischel’s work on delayed gratification in children
highlights the role of attention. In his design, an experimenter placed a single treat (cookie or marshmallow) in front of a child and said that she would leave
the room. If the child waited and did not eat the treat
until she returned, the child could have two additional
treats. The experimenter would then leave the room and
measure how long the children would wait (up to 15–
20 min). Mischel and colleagues manipulated attention
in several ways. First, they simply varied whether the
children could see the treat. When the treat was hidden,
the children waited significantly longer than when it
was visible. Next, the experimenters drew the children’s
attention to the treat in different ways. They either focused the children’s attention on the delicious properties of the treat (e.g., “the marshmallow sure looks like
a yummy, sweet treat, doesn’t it?”) or had them divert
their attention by thinking of the treat as something else
(e.g., “imagine the marshmallow is a soft, fluffy cloud”).
Again, diverting attention from the treat as food increased patience. Similar studies in animals have used
the delayed gratification paradigm. Pigeons, for instance, can wait longer when their food is not visible,
and chimpanzees can wait longer when experimenters provide toys to distract subjects from the accumulating food. The availability of distraction therefore can
increase patience—reducing attention to waiting makes
delays more tolerable.
Mechanisms of control
One of the most interesting and controversial topics in
psychology is the nature of mechanisms of control over
behavior. Are behaviors consciously or reflexively controlled? Are they genetically determined, learned, or
reasoned out? These questions certainly apply to intertemporal choice, but unfortunately we have not begun
to address them systematically. Claiming that plants
make intertemporal choices suggests that strong genetic
mechanisms with relevant environmental input can
generate intertemporal choices. Of course, the same can
be said of animals. Parasitoid wasps, for instance, can
detect cues associated with a short life expectancy (such
as lower barometric pressure indicating an impending
storm).When detecting these cues, they lay more eggs in
lower quality hosts than in the absence of the cues. They

therefore accept a lower reproductive output when responding to a shortened temporal horizon. Caching also
likely falls under the category of intertemporal choices
with strong genetic components. Caching species probably do not weigh the current and future benefits of the
seeds in front of them—foresight months into the future
seems unlikely. Nevertheless, caching species show extreme flexibility in their behavior, and foresight into a
much shorter future seems perfectly reasonable. Experiments with scrub jays show that they attend to the decay of food, the time since caching, the presence of possible cache thieves, and future need. Thus, they have an
extraordinarily flexible system for dealing with delayed
rewards, although we do not fully understand how they
represent the future. The abstract representation of time
in humans allows us extreme flexibility in anticipating future payoffs—we can mentally travel in time. Although other animals can plan for the short term (hours,
maybe days), the full scope of their mental time horizons remains unclear.

Evolution of Intertemporal Choice
The psychological approach offers insight into the
mechanisms of intertemporal choice, but it does not offer a satisfying explanation of the circumstances under
which animals should choose patiently or impulsively.
An evolutionary account, however, can make specific
predictions about temporal preferences and the change
in discount rate over time. The evolutionary view
stresses the fit between the decision mechanisms used to
make temporal trade-offs and the environment in which
these mechanisms evolved. Thus, natural selection favors a good fit between the decisions and the ecology
of organisms—temporal preferences should be “ecologically rational” rather than economically rational. This
perspective leads to predictions that can account for
some of the variation in species differences in patience
and impulsivity.
The ecological rationality perspective suggests that decision mechanisms should fit the environment in which
they operate. Thus, intertemporal choices should match
the kinds of problems often faced by animals. This may
explain animal impulsivity in the self-control paradigm.
Rather than discounting, the rats and pigeons in these experiments may use simple rate-maximizing rules that are
adapted to foraging in patches (maximizing intake also
results in a hyperbolic discounting function). David Stephens and his colleagues have proposed that actual foraging situations rarely have the property of simultaneous
choice used in the self-control paradigms (Figure 2(a)).
Instead, animals typically choose when to leave a patch.
A rule that maximizes the short-term intake rate:
A
t+h

[4]
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where t represents the delay and h represents the time
required to process the food, makes similar predictions
as the long-term rule (Equation [1]) in the patch situation. In the self-control situation, however, it predicts
impulsive choice. Experiments with blue jays suggest
that they make appropriate decisions in a patch situation, but choose more impulsively than expected in a
self-control situation. This short-term rule is ecologically
rational because it works well in a more naturalistic environment in which animals forage in patches.
Ecological rationality can also make predictions about
species differences in intertemporal choice because species differ in their ecologies. Although relatively few animals have been tested systematically, interesting patterns emerge in the data across species. Comparing
species can pose difficulties, especially with phylogenetically distant species. With more closely related species, however, the comparative method can yield interesting insights. For instance, chimpanzees and bonobos
are sister taxa that share many morphological, ecological, and behavioral similarities. Yet, they differ in key
aspects of their foraging ecologies. Although their diets overlap substantially, chimpanzees often hunt for
food, whereas bonobos spend more time consuming the
abundant terrestrial herbaceous vegetation in their habitat. This means that chimpanzees frequently face delays
in food consumption: they decide to hunt and then must
wait until capturing food before consuming it. Bonobos,
in contrast, rarely hunt, instead feeding on the plentiful
vegetation that is virtually immediately accessible. Ecological rationality would predict that these differences
in foraging ecology should translate into different decision mechanisms and preferences between the two species. In fact, chimpanzees are more patient in the selfcontrol task than bonobos, reflecting the differences in
natural foraging. Although chimpanzees and bonobos
differ, they wait longer than any other species systematically tested so far. Macaques wait for an intermediate length of time, and capuchin monkeys, tamarins,
and marmosets wait as long as pigeons and rats. Yet differences still exist between these species, some of which
may result from foraging ecology. The comparative
study of intertemporal choice remains in its infancy, and
testing more species can help reveal the underlying nature of temporal preferences.
See also: Animal Arithmetic; Caching; Mental Time Travel: Can Animals Recall the Past and Plan for the Future?; Optimal Foraging Theory: Introduction; Patch Exploitation; Rational Choice Behavior: Definitions and Evidence.
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